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Sharing opportunities under externalities
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AI
DOI：10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103249.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
A subset of economic agents in a society is aware of the existence of an economic opportunity, and compete to exploit it. We study incentives to communicate about the existence of this economic opportunity when its exploitation by the winner generates externalities to other agents. We characterize the equilibria of the communication game, identify conditions under which stronger externalities generate more communication, and highlight the tension between equilibrium and efficient communication.
Keywords:
Opportunity
Strategic communication
Externalities
Journal
J
IF:
0.7
Papers:
41
Citations:
0
