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Signature-Based Protection from Code Reuse Attacks
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DOI：10.1109/TC.2013.230.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
Code Reuse Attacks (CRAs) recently emerged as a new class of security exploits. CRAs construct malicious programs out of small fragments (gadgets) of existing code, thus eliminating the need for code injection. Existing defenses against CRAs often incur large performance overheads or require extensive binary rewriting and other changes to the system software. In this paper, we examine a signature-based detection of CRAs, where the attack is detected by observing the behavior of programs and detecting the gadget execution patterns. We first demonstrate that naive signature-based defenses can be defeated by introducing special delay gadgets as part of the attack. We then show how a software-configurable signature-based approach can be designed to defend against such stealth CRAs, including the attacks that manage to use longer-length gadgets. The proposed defense (called SCRAP) can be implemented entirely in hardware using simple logic at the commit stage of the pipeline. SCRAPis realized with minimal performance cost, no changes to the software layers, and no implications on binary compatibility. Finally, we show that SCRAP generates no false alarms on a wide range of applications.
Keywords:
Processor architectures
support for security
code reuse attacks
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