.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Return
Single-Leader-Multiple-Followers Stackelberg Security Game With Hypergame Framework
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1109/TIFS.2022.3155294.png)
.png){kind=icon}
Original request for help.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
In this paper, we employ a hypergame framework to analyze the single-leader-multiple-followers (SLMF) Stackelberg security game with two typical misinformed situations: misperception and deception. We provide a stability criterion with the help of hyper Nash equilibrium (HNE) to investigate both strategic stability and cognitive stability of equilibria in SLMF games with misinformation. In fact, we find mild stable conditions such that the equilibria with misperception and deception can become HNE. Moreover, we discuss the robustness of the equilibria to reveal whether players have the ability to keep their profits under the influence of some misinformation.
Keywords:
Games
Security
Stability criteria
Power system stability
Fake news
Robustness
Cognition
Stackelberg security game
hypergame
misperception
deception
cognition
stability
Journal
IF:
8
Papers:
5.2K
Citations:
2.3W