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Smart Cap

delete2024-05-07
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PRE
AI
L
Larry S. Karp *
C
Christian P. Traeger
DOI:10.1093/jeea/jvae030delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
Policymakers'imperfect knowledge about firms' abatement costs leads to inefficient regulation, reducing the welfare gains from carbon markets around the world. We introduce a smart cap and trade system that eliminates these costs. This cap responds endogenously to technology or macroeconomic shocks, relying on the market price of certificates to aggregate information. It allows policy makers to modify existing institutions to achieve more efficient emissions reductions. The paper also shows that the slow diffusion of technology innovations typically makes the optimal carbon price a much steeper function of emissions than suggested by the Social Cost of Carbon.
Keywords:
IMPERFECT INFORMATION
STOCK EXTERNALITIES
INTENSITY TARGETS
PERMIT MARKETS
EMISSIONS
PRICES
UNCERTAINTY
QUANTITIES
POLICIES
DESIGN

Journal

Journal of the European Economic Association cover
Journal of the European Economic Association
IF:
3.3
Papers:
1.4K
Citations:
6.6K

Organization

U
University of California Berkeley
Scholars:
3.5W
Papers: 2.8W
Citations: 11.3W
University of California System cover
University of California System
Scholars:
37.5W
Papers: 33.7W
Citations: 6.6K