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Smart I/O Modules for Mitigating Cyber-Physical Attacks on Industrial Control Systems
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DOI：10.1109/TII.2019.2945520.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are implemented in many industrial and embedded control applications. Where these systems are safety-critical, correct and safe behavior is of paramount importance. Malicious attacks on such CPSs can have far-reaching repercussions. For instance, if elements of a power grid behave erratically, physical damage and loss of life could occur. Currently, there is a trend toward increased complexity and connectivity of CPS. However, as this occurs, the potential attack vectors for these systems grow in number, increasing the risk that a given controller might become compromised. In this article, we examine how the dangers of compromised controllers can be mitigated. We propose a novel application of runtime enforcement that can secure the safety of real-world physical systems. Here, we synthesize enforcers to a new hardware architecture within programmable logic controller I/O modules to act as an effective line of defence between the cyber and the physical domains. Our enforcers prevent the physical damage that a compromised control system might be able to perform. To demonstrate the efficacy of our approach, we present several benchmarks, and show that the overhead for each system is extremely minimal.
Keywords:
Runtime
Security
Hardware
Monitoring
Control systems
Safety
Industries
Cyber-physical attacks
cyber-physical systems (CPSs)
industrial control systems
security
runtime enforcement
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