.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Return
Sortition and cognitive ability
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1177/1470594X251414946.png)
.png){kind=icon}
Original request for help.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
There is a growing sense that representative democracy is in crisis, leading to renewed interest in alternative institutional designs. One popular proposal-what I call legislative sortition-says we should replace elected legislators with randomly selected citizens. While legislative sortition has drawn both numerous supporters and critics, one objection has received little attention: that ordinary citizens' lower cognitive abilities, relative to elected officials, will diminish the quality of governance. This paper articulates and evaluates this concern, distinguishing between several versions of it. I argue that some forms of the objection are implausibly strong, but that a suitably qualified version can be defended. Although this does not provide a decisive reason to reject legislative sortition, it meaningfully shapes how we should assess its promise.
Keywords:
sortition
lottocracy
representative democracy
elections
political selection
adverse selection
Journal
P
IF:
1.6
Papers:
16
Citations:
0
