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Sortition and cognitive ability

delete2026-01-01
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PRE
AI
B
Brian Kogelmann *
DOI:10.1177/1470594X251414946delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
There is a growing sense that representative democracy is in crisis, leading to renewed interest in alternative institutional designs. One popular proposal-what I call legislative sortition-says we should replace elected legislators with randomly selected citizens. While legislative sortition has drawn both numerous supporters and critics, one objection has received little attention: that ordinary citizens' lower cognitive abilities, relative to elected officials, will diminish the quality of governance. This paper articulates and evaluates this concern, distinguishing between several versions of it. I argue that some forms of the objection are implausibly strong, but that a suitably qualified version can be defended. Although this does not provide a decisive reason to reject legislative sortition, it meaningfully shapes how we should assess its promise.
Keywords:
sortition
lottocracy
representative democracy
elections
political selection
adverse selection

Journal

P
POLITICS PHILOSOPHY & ECONOMICS
IF:
1.6
Papers:
16
Citations:
0

Organization

Purdue University System cover
Purdue University System
Scholars:
4.0W
Papers: 3.6W
Citations: 66
Cited Papers

Cited Papers

Bad politicians
err2004-03-01
err0
errOAAI
errFrancesco Caselli; Massimo Morelli
errShare
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A Theory of Justice
err
IF0
err2020-09-02
err0
PREAI
errJohn Rawls
errShare
errSave
In Defense of (Limited) Oligarchy
err
IF0
err2023-10-01
err0
PREAI
errBrian Kogelmann
errShare
errSave
Are Risk Aversion and Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability?
err2010-06-01
err722
errOAAI
errDohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; Sunde, Uwe
errShare
errSave
errShare
errSave
Representative Democracy
err
IF0
err2025-03-19
err0
PREAI
errLanda,Dimitri; Pevnick,Ryan
errShare
errSave
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