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SPATIAL PRICING IN INTERDEPENDENT MARKETS
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DOI：10.1111/j.1467-9787.1992.tb00168.x.png)
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Abstract
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Conditions for spatial price equilibrium are derived for a set of firms in oligopolistic spatial competition, distributed at fixed locations in a heterogeneous region where consumer purchasing patterns are a probabilistic function of the price distribution rather than a deterministic function of proximity to firms. The resulting prices vary with accessibility to consumers or with the degree of local spatial monopoly, and result in non-zero profits for firms. Conditions describing the existence and stability properties of this spatial price equilibrium are defined, and are shown to be equivalent for two different hypotheses concerning disequilibrium pricing behavior: a partial price adjustment model and a Bertrand game. For two different profit goals, total profit maximization and profit rate maximization, it is shown that a spatial price equilibrium exists and is at least locally quasi-stable.
Keywords:
VARIATIONAL-INEQUALITIES
EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEMS
MODELS
COMPETITION
EXISTENCE
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