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Spectrum Sharing Between Wireless Networks
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DOI：10.1109/TNET.2010.2043114.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
We consider the problem of two wireless networks operating on the same (presumably unlicensed) frequency band. Pairs within a given network cooperate to schedule transmissions, but between networks there is competition for spectrum. To make the problem tractable, we assume transmissions are scheduled according to a random access protocol where each network chooses an access probability for its users. A game between the two networks is defined. We characterize the Nash Equilibrium behavior of the system. Three regimes are identified: one in which both networks simultaneously schedule all transmissions, one in which the denser network schedules all transmissions and the sparser only schedules a fraction, and one in which both networks schedule only a fraction of their transmissions. The regime of operation depends on the path loss exponent alpha, the latter regime being desirable but attainable only for alpha > 4. This suggests that in certain environments, rival wireless networks may end up naturally cooperating. To substantiate our analytical results, we simulate a system where networks iteratively optimize their access probabilities in a greedy manner. We also discuss a distributed scheduling protocol that employs carrier sensing and demonstrate via simulations that again a near cooperative equilibrium exists for sufficiently large alpha.
Keywords:
Carrier sensing
game theory
Nash equilibrium (NE)
price of anarchy
random access
spectrum sharing
wireless ad hoc networks
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