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Statistical Higher-Order Correlation Attacks Against Code-Based Masking
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DOI：10.1109/TC.2024.3424208.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
Masking is one of the most well-established methods to thwart side-channel attacks. Many masking schemes have been proposed in the literature, and code-based masking emerges and unifies several masking schemes in a coding-theoretic framework. In this work, we investigate the side-channel resistance of code-based masking from a non-profiling perspective by utilizing correlation-based side-channel attacks. We present a systematic evaluation of correlation attacks with various higher-order (centered) moments and then present the form of optimal correlation attacks. Interestingly, the Pearson correlation coefficient between the hypothetical leakage and the measured traces is connected to the signal-to-noise ratio in higher-order moments, and it turns out to be easy to evaluate rather than launch repeated attacks. We also identify some ineffective higher-order correlation attacks at certain orders when the device leaks under the Hamming weight leakage model. Our theoretical findings are verified through both simulated and real-world measurements.
Keywords:
Correlation
Hamming weight
Linear codes
Correlation coefficient
Codecs
Computers
Vectors
Side-channel attack
masked cryptographic implementation
higher-order (Pearson) correlation attack
effective attack order
Boolean masking
Inner product masking
code-based masking
pre/post-silicon evaluation
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