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Strategic communication among banks
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DOI：10.1016/j.jfineco.2026.104338.png)
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Abstract
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How do bank networks facilitate information flows that shape market outcomes? Using international banks’ advisory activities in corporate takeovers as their source of private information, we show in supervisory data that banks with closer ties to the target, but not the acquirer, advisor trade profitably in the target’s stock prior to the deal announcement. This trading behavior is associated with a higher premium paid without compromising deal success. As connected banks’ incentives are aligned only with target shareholders’ interests, which are represented by the target advisor, our evidence suggests that economic incentives determine which banks share information and with whom.
Keywords:
D22
G14
G20
G21
L14
Bank networks
Trading
Information transmission
Mergers and acquisitions
Syndicated lending
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