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The art of coercion: credible threats and the assurance dilemma
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DOI：10.1093/ia/iiag095.png)
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Abstract
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Existing scholarship argues that the severity and credibility of threats determine how the target responds to a compellent demand. For example in their article Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill outline the key reasons that compellence, a coercive strategy through which a coercer aims to force the enemy (target) to take actions against its will, fails (Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, ‘The power and limits of compellence: a research note’, Political Science Quarterly 133: 1, 2018). The reasons they provide are primarily centred on the target's resolve to defend the status quo, concerns about the target's reputational damage, and the credibility of threats that the coercer issues. In his latest book, The art of coercion: credible threats and the assurance dilemma, international security scholar Reid B. C. Pauly critiques this overemphasis on a threat-centric paradigm, calling it ‘woefully incomplete’ (p. 1). His book compellingly explains why targets must perceive threats to be sufficiently conditional and not just credible and severe.
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