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The Effect of Low-Carbon Transition Strategy Disclosure on Analyst Following: The Moderating Role of Managerial Myopia
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DOI：10.1002/bse.71407.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
As firms increasingly disclose low-carbon transition strategies, research on this specific component of nonfinancial disclosure remains limited. This study examines the effect of low-carbon transition strategy disclosure on analyst following. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2008 to 2024, we find a positive association between low-carbon transition strategy disclosure and analyst following. This association is economically meaningful and remains robust after addressing endogeneity concerns and conducting multiple robustness tests. Mechanism evidence supports the analyst supply and demand perspective: Low-carbon transition strategy disclosure is associated with greater investor–relations interaction, indicating stronger market demand for analysts' interpretation services, and with a richer information environment, suggesting lower costs for analysts to collect, process, and verify firm information. However, managerial myopia weakens this effect, indicating that analysts respond less strongly when managers have a stronger short-term orientation. Overall, this study explains why low-carbon transition strategy disclosure attracts analyst following from the analyst supply and demand perspective. In addition, it shows how managerial myopia weakens the capital-market attention benefits of low-carbon transition strategy disclosure, providing new evidence on how financial markets respond to sustainability challenges under short-term logic. Finally, this study advances accounting research at the intersection of business strategy, environmental disclosure, and capital-market information intermediaries.
Keywords:
analyst following
analyst supply and demand perspective
low-carbon transition strategy disclosure
managerial myopia
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