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The Runner-Up Effect
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DOI：10.1086/686746.png)
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Abstract
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Exploiting regression discontinuity designs in Brazilian, Indian, and Canadian first-past-the-post elections, we document that second-place candidates are substantially more likely than close third-place candidates to run in, and win, subsequent elections. Since both candidates lost the election and had similar electoral performance, this is the effect of being labeled the runner-up. Selection into candidacy is unlikely to explain the effect on winning subsequent elections, and we find no effect of finishing in third place versus fourth place. We develop a simple model of strategic coordination by voters that rationalizes the results and provides further predictions that are supported by the data.
Keywords:
REGRESSION-DISCONTINUITY DESIGNS
US-HOUSE ELECTIONS
INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE
DUVERGERS LAW
VOTER TURNOUT
SELECTION
TELEVISION
MODEL
RESPONSIVENESS
COORDINATION
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