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Valence Asymmetry in Cognition—A Formal Account
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DOI：10.1177/10888683251407820.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
<jats:sec>
<jats:title>Academic Abstract</jats:title>
<jats:p>
<jats:italic toggle="yes">Valence asymmetries</jats:italic>
—the tendency for bad stimuli to elicit more processing effort than good ones—have been widely observed but remain theoretically contested. To advance this debate, we present a formalized account integrating two major explanatory perspectives: the
<jats:italic toggle="yes">intrapsychic</jats:italic>
(or
<jats:italic toggle="yes">phylogenetic</jats:italic>
) approach, which locates the effect in internal evaluative mechanisms, and the
<jats:italic toggle="yes">ecological</jats:italic>
(or
<jats:italic toggle="yes">ontogenetic</jats:italic>
) approach, which attributes it primarily to environmental factors. We introduce a concise set of parameters to specify key concepts and analyze the argumentative structure of each perspective. This yields three major insights: (a) the traditional labels for these approaches are misleading, and we suggest using
<jats:italic toggle="yes">valence-driven</jats:italic>
and
<jats:italic toggle="yes">distinctiveness-driven</jats:italic>
instead, (b) theories must specify how exactly
<jats:italic toggle="yes">good</jats:italic>
and
<jats:italic toggle="yes">bad</jats:italic>
stimuli are defined, and (c) some explanations rely on implicit yet critical assumptions, such as the probability of having contact with stimuli. Clarifying these foundations provides a framework for informative empirical tests in future research.
</jats:p>
</jats:sec>
<jats:sec>
<jats:title>Public Abstract</jats:title>
<jats:p>
Why do people pay more attention to bad things than to good ones? Psychologists call this pattern a
<jats:italic toggle="yes">valence asymmetry</jats:italic>
. Although the effect is well established, its causes are still debated. To advance this debate, we translate two leading ideas about this bias into a precise mathematical model. This allows us to see how the explanations differ, what each predicts, and where they overlap. This analysis reveals three important insights: First, some widely used terms are misleading, and we suggest using clearer alternatives like
<jats:italic toggle="yes">valence-driven</jats:italic>
and
<jats:italic toggle="yes">distinctiveness-driven</jats:italic>
instead. Second, researchers need to define more carefully what actually counts as
<jats:italic toggle="yes">good</jats:italic>
or
<jats:italic toggle="yes">bad</jats:italic>
. Third, many theories rely on hidden assumptions—such as how often people encounter certain kinds of stimuli. Making those assumptions explicit should help future studies test competing explanations more directly.
</jats:p>
</jats:sec>
Keywords:
Valence asymmetry
Cognitive processing
Valence-driven
Distinctiveness-driven
Formal model
Journal
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IF:
10.4
Papers:
30
Citations:
0
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