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Valuings as Sentiments
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DOI：10.1111/phpr.70093.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
We are valuing beings, beings who possess the capacity to value things. But what is it to value something? The most common accounts in the literature hold that to value an item is either to have a first-order or a second-order desire toward it; or to believe that item to be valuable; or to care about that item; or to have a combination of all these mental states. In our paper, we raise some objections against all these accounts and defend a new affective account of valuings. Unlike standard affective accounts, according to which the term valuing refers to a single type of affective state, such as care, we hold that valuing refers to the members of a class of affective states, namely, the class of sentiments. On our view, to value something is to have a particular sentiment toward it. Since sentiments can be of different types, our account implies that there are as many ways of valuing things as there are types of sentiments.
Keywords:
carings
desires
emotions
evaluative properties
sentiments
value judgments
valuings
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