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Variation in Institutional Strength
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DOI：10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.091106.121756.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
Comparative research on political institutions has begun to turn from issues of formal institutional design to issues of institutional strength. Rather than assuming a tight fit between formal rules and political behavior, these studies examine how variation in the stability and/or enforcement of formal rules shapes actors' expectations and behavior. This article explores die emerging research agenda on institutional strength. It: disaggregates the concept of institutional strength into two dimensions-enforcement and stability-and it argues that institutions vary widely on both dimensions. The article then examines the sources of this variation and its implications for comparative research. It shows how recent research on weak institutions may be used to refine existing theories of institutional effects, design, and development, which should broaden the comparative scope of these theories. The conclusion examines; ways of developing comparative measures of institutional strength.
Keywords:
political institutions
institutional development
weak institutions
enforcement
stability
developing countries
Journal
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9.5
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598
Citations:
7.4K