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Verifying DRAM Addressing in Software
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DOI：10.1007/978-3-032-07894-0_10.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
In this paper, we introduce a novel approach to reliably verifying DRAM addressing functions and function components from software. We perform the first systematic analysis of 5 DRAM function reverse-engineering tools on 2 different DDR3, 4 DDR4, and 4 DDR5 system configurations, revealing a significant variance in the success rate of these tools, from 0% to 92.9%. We discover the previously unknown rank selection side channel and reverse engineer its function on two DDR4 and two DDR5 systems. These results enable novel DDR5 row-conflict side-channel attacks, which we demonstrate in two scenarios: First, we evaluate the DDR5 row-conflict side channel in a covert channel with 1.39Mbit/s. Second, we evaluate the channel in a website fingerprinting attack with an F-1 score of 84% on DDR4 and 74% on DDR5.
Keywords:
DRAM addressing
reverse-engineering
side-channel attacks
DDR5
row-conflict
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