.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Return
Worker replacement
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.05.015.png)
.png){kind=icon}
Original request for help.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
Consider a labor market in which firms want to insure existing employees against income fluctuations and, simultaneously, want to recruit new employees to fill vacant jobs. Firms can commit to a wage policy, i.e. a policy that specifies the wage paid to their employees as a function of tenure, productivity and other observables. However, firms cannot commit to employ workers. In this environment, the optimal wage policy prescribes not only a rigid wage for senior workers, but also a downward rigid wage for new hires. The downward rigidity in the hiring wage magnifies the response of unemployment to negative shocks. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
EMPLOYMENT FLUCTUATIONS
IMPLICIT CONTRACTS
WAGE STICKINESS
UNEMPLOYMENT
VACANCIES
Journal
IF:
4.1
Papers:
3.2K
Citations:
1.1W
