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Takuo Sugaya

Stanford University

12H指数
53论文数
599被引数
收录论文 16
发表时间
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Collusion with Optimal Information Disclosure与最优信息披露的共谋
errThe Quarterly Journal of Economics
IF0
err2026-04-11
err0
PREAI
errTakuo Sugaya; Alexander Wolitzky
err分享
err收藏
Nonrecursive dynamic incentives: A rate of convergence approach
errTHEORETICAL ECONOMICS
IF1.3
err2025-11-01
err0
PREAI
errSugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
err分享
err收藏
Keeping players in the dark: benefits of private monitoring让玩家保持信息不透明：私人监控的益处
errJAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW
IF0
err2025-09-01
err0
PREAI
errSugaya, Takuo
err分享
err收藏
Mediated Collusion
errJOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
IF6.3
err2024-04-01
err0
PREAI
errOrtner, Juan; Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
err分享
err收藏
Electoral Campaigns as Dynamic Contests
errJOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
IF3.3
err2024-01-31
err0
errOAAI
errAcharya, Avidit; Grillo, Edoardo; Sugaya, Takuo; Turkel, Eray
err分享
err收藏
The Dynamics of a Policy Outcome: Market Response and Bureaucratic Enforcement of a Policy Change
errAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
IF5.6
err2023-03-22
err4
PREAI
errCallander, Steven; Foarta, Dana; Sugaya, Takuo
err分享
err收藏
Monitoring versus Discounting in Repeated Games
errECONOMETRICA
IF7.1
err2023-01-01
err0
PREAI
errSugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
err分享
err收藏
Market Competition and Political Influence: An Integrated Approach市场竞争与政治影响: 一种综合方法
errECONOMETRICA
IF7.1
err2022-01-01
err11
PREAI
errCallander, Steven; Foarta, Dana; Sugaya, Takuo
err分享
err收藏
Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring具有私人监视的重复博弈中的民间定理
errREVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
IF6.4
err2021-11-24
err10
errOAAI
errSugaya, Takuo
err分享
err收藏
Communication and Community Enforcement
errJOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
IF6.3
err2021-09-01
err4
errOAAI
errSugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
err分享
err收藏
Measuring the Incentive to Collude: The Vitamin Cartels, 1990-99
errREVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
IF6.4
err2021-08-18
err26
PREAI
errIgami, Mitsuru; Sugaya, Takuo
err分享
err收藏
The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games
errREVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
IF6.4
err2020-08-03
err12
PREAI
errSugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
err分享
err收藏
OPTIMAL TIMING OF POLICY ANNOUNCEMENTS IN DYNAMIC ELECTION CAMPAIGNS
errQUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
IF12.7
err2020-04-20
err5
PREAI
errKamada, Yuichiro; Sugaya, Takuo
err分享
err收藏
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching具有匿名随机匹配的重复博弈中的Folk定理
errECONOMETRICA
IF7.1
err2020-01-01
err11
PREAI
errDeb, Joyee; Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
err分享
err收藏
Maintaining Privacy in Cartels
errJOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
IF6.3
err2018-12-01
err16
errOAAI
errSugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
err分享
err收藏
RECURSIVE METHODS IN DISCOUNTED STOCHASTIC GAMES: AN ALGORITHM FOR δ → 1 AND A FOLK THEOREM
errECONOMETRICA
IF7.1
err2011-01-01
err62
PREAI
errHoerner, Johannes; Sugaya, Takuo; Takahashi, Satoru; Vieille, Nicolas
err分享
err收藏

研究方向

暂时未获取到该数据
合作学者
合作期刊
J
Johannes Hörner
H 指数: 27 · 论文数: 145
S
Satoru Takahashi
H 指数: 23 · 论文数: 144
N
Nicolas Vieille
H 指数: 22 · 论文数: 110
S
Steven Callander
H 指数: 21 · 论文数: 50
A
Alexander Wolitzky
H 指数: 17 · 论文数: 89
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