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D
Denis Gromb
HEC Paris
26
H指数
65
论文数
5.1K
被引数
0
相关解读
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11
发表时间
发表时间
IF
被引数
Financial Restructuring and Resolution of Banks
The Review of Financial Studies
IF
0
2025-12-26
0
PRE
AI
Jean-Edouard Colliard; Denis Gromb
分享
收藏
Is one share/one vote optimal?†
一股一票制是最优的吗?†
REVIEW OF FINANCE
IF
8.4
2025-04-10
0
PRE
AI
Gromb, Denis
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收藏
Conflicting Priorities: A Theory of Covenants and Collateral
优先权冲突:契约与担保的理论
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
IF
9.5
2025-04-09
1
PRE
AI
Donaldson, Jason Roderick; Gromb, Denis; Piacentino, Giorgia
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收藏
The Dynamics of Financially Constrained Arbitrage
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
IF
9.5
2018-07-20
43
OA
AI
Gromb, Denis; Vayanos, Dimitri
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Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
IF
9.5
2014-05-08
28
OA
AI
Burkart, Mike; Gromb, Denis; Mueller, Holger M.; Panunzi, Fausto
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Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
IF
5.7
2012-04-01
119
OA
AI
Acharya, Viral V.; Gromb, Denis; Yorulmazer, Tanju
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A MODEL OF FINANCIAL MARKET LIQUIDITY BASED ON INTERMEDIARY CAPITAL
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
IF
3.3
2011-01-06
33
OA
AI
Gromb, Denis; Vayanos, Dimitri
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收藏
Limits of Arbitrage
ANNUAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
IF
0
2010-12-01
241
PRE
AI
Gromb, Denis; Vayanos, Dimitri
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Public trading and private incentives
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
IF
5.4
2004-04-02
118
PRE
AI
Faure-Grimaud, A; Gromb, D
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收藏
Agency conflicts in public and negotiated transfers of corporate control
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
IF
9.5
2002-12-17
74
OA
AI
Burkart, M; Gromb, D; Panunzi, F
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Why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
IF
6.3
1998-02-01
154
OA
AI
Burkart, M; Gromb, D; Panunzi, F
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研究方向
暂时未获取到该数据
合作学者
合作期刊
V
Viral V. Acharya
H 指数: 92 · 论文数: 564
D
Dimitri Vayanos
H 指数: 42 · 论文数: 126
T
Tanju Yorulmazer
H 指数: 29 · 论文数: 80
H
Holger M. Mueller
H 指数: 28 · 论文数: 134
M
Mike Burkart
H 指数: 20 · 论文数: 73
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