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D

Dilip Abreu

New York University

26H指数
70论文数
8.3K被引数
收录论文 9
发表时间
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Algorithms for Stochastic Games With Perfect Monitoring
errECONOMETRICA
IF7.1
err2020-01-01
err2
errOAAI
errAbreu, Dilip; Brooks, Benjamin; Sannikov, Yuliy
err分享
err收藏
A Dynamic Reinterpretation of Nash Bargaining With Endogenous Threats具有内生威胁的纳什讨价还价的动态重新解释
errECONOMETRICA
IF7.1
err2015-01-01
err17
PREAI
errAbreu, Dilip; Pearce, David
err分享
err收藏
Bargaining, reputation, and equilibrium selection in repeated games with contracts
errECONOMETRICA
IF7.1
err2007-05-01
err44
errOAAI
errAbreu, Dilip; Pearce, David
err分享
err收藏
A NOTE ON ABREU-MATSUSHIMA MECHANISMS
errECONOMETRICA
IF7.1
err1992-11-01
err11
PREAI
errABREU, D; MATSUSHIMA, H
err分享
err收藏
VIRTUAL IMPLEMENTATION IN ITERATIVELY UNDOMINATED STRATEGIES - COMPLETE INFORMATION
errECONOMETRICA
IF7.1
err1992-09-01
err126
PREAI
errABREU, D; MATSUSHIMA, H
err分享
err收藏
INFORMATION AND TIMING IN REPEATED PARTNERSHIPS
errECONOMETRICA
IF7.1
err1991-11-01
err169
errOAAI
errABREU, D; MILGROM, P; PEARCE, D
err分享
err收藏
VIRTUAL IMPLEMENTATION IN NASH EQUILIBRIUM
errECONOMETRICA
IF7.1
err1991-07-01
err104
PREAI
errABREU, D; SEN, A
err分享
err收藏
TOWARD A THEORY OF DISCOUNTED REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING
errECONOMETRICA
IF7.1
err1990-09-01
err679
errOAAI
errABREU, D; PEARCE, D; STACCHETTI, E
err分享
err收藏
THE STRUCTURE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH FINITE AUTOMATA
errECONOMETRICA
IF7.1
err1988-11-01
err243
PREAI
errABREU, D; RUBINSTEIN, A
err分享
err收藏

研究方向

暂时未获取到该数据
合作学者
合作期刊
P
Paul Milgrom
H 指数: 73 · 论文数: 239
A
Ariel Rubinstein
H 指数: 63 · 论文数: 345
B
B. A. Brooks
H 指数: 33 · 论文数: 207
A
Arunava Sen
H 指数: 24 · 论文数: 105
D
David Pearce
H 指数: 23 · 论文数: 91
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