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摘要
En 中文
A principal delegates multiple decisions to an agent, who has private information relevant to each decision. The principal is uncertain about the agent's preferences. I solve for max-min optimal mechanisms those which maximize the principal's payoff against the worst case agent preference types. These mechanisms are characterized by a property I call aligned delegation: all agent types play identically, as if they shared the principal's preferences. Max-min optimal mechanisms may take the simple forms of ranking mechanisms, budgets, or sequential quotas.
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11.6
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5.0K
被引数:
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