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Another chance for good reasoning
DOI:10.3758/s13423-017-1252-5.png)
摘要
En 中文
Disagreement on the probability status of chances casts doubt on Girotto and Gonzalez's (2001) conclusion that the human mind can make sound Bayesian inferences involving single-event probabilities. The main objection raised has been that chances are de facto natural frequencies disguised as probabilities. In the present study, we empirically demonstrated that numbers of chances are perceived as being distinct from natural frequencies and that they have a facilitatory effect on Bayesian inference tasks that is completely independent from their (minor) frequentist readings. Overall, therefore, our results strongly disconfirm the hypothesis that natural frequencies are a privileged cognitive representational format for Bayesian inferences and suggest that a significant portion of laypeople adequately handle genuine single-event probability problems once these are rendered computationally more accessible by using numbers of chances.
Keyword:
Chances
Single-event probability
Natural frequencies
Probabilistic reasoning
Bayesian reasoning
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