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Does position uncertainty foster cooperation?
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DOI：10.1017/esa.2025.10020.png)
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摘要
En 中文
We design an experiment to study the implications of introducing position uncertainty in a social dilemma where eight players decide to contribute to a public good sequentially. Contributions are significantly higher when players make sequential decisions to contribute or not, are uncertain about their position in the sequence, and observe a sample of their predecessors' choices compared to the simultaneous-move game. Yet, contribution rates remain invariant to the number of agents sampled. Consequently, contributions don't unravel even with position certainty, and there is no incremental benefit of introducing position uncertainty, contrary to the theoretical prediction. Furthermore, controlling for the sum of contributions observed, individuals contribute less the later in the sequence they are.
Keyword:
Cooperation
experiments
position uncertainty
public goods game
strategy method
C72
C91
C92
H41
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期刊
J
IF:
0.6
论文数:
15
被引数:
0
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Simultaneous versus sequential public good provision and the role of refunds — An experimental study
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