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摘要
En 中文
We study how barter exchanges should be conducted through a centralized mechanism in a dynamically evolving agent pool with time-and compatibility-based preferences. We derive the dynamically efficient two-way and multi-way exchange mechanisms that maximize total discounted exchange surplus. Recently several live-donor kidney exchange programmes were established to swap incompatible donors of end-stage kidney disease patients. Since kidney exchange can be modelled as a special instance of our more general model, dynamically efficient kidney exchange mechanisms are derived as corollaries. We make policy recommendations using simulations.
Keyword:
HOUSE ALLOCATION
COMPATIBILITY
ASSIGNMENT
MARKETS
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6.4
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2.5K
被引数:
2.1W
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