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Functional Analysis Attacks on Logic Locking

delete2020-01-01
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OA
AI
D
Deepak Sirone
P
Pramod Subramanyan *
DOI:10.1109/TIFS.2020.2968183delete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
Logic locking refers to a set of techniques that can protect integrated circuits (ICs) from counterfeiting, piracy and malicious functionality changes by an untrusted foundry. It achieves these goals by introducing new inputs, called key inputs, and additional logic to an IC such that the circuit produces the correct output only when the key inputs are set to specific values. The correct values of the key inputs are kept secret from the untrusted foundry and programmed after manufacturing and before distribution, thus rendering piracy, counterfeiting and malicious design changes infeasible. The security of logic locking relies on the assumption that the untrusted foundry cannot infer the correct values of the key inputs by analysis of the circuit. In this paper, we introduce a new attack on state-of-the-art logic locking schemes which invalidates the above assumption. We propose nalysis attacks on ocking algorithms (abbreviated as FALL attacks). FALL attacks have two stages. Their first stage is dependent on the locking algorithm and involves analyzing structural and functional properties of locked circuits to identify a list of potential locking keys. The second stage is algorithm agnostic and introduces a powerful addition to SAT-based attacks called key confirmation. Key confirmation can identify the correct key from a list of alternatives and works even on circuits that are resilient to the SAT attack. In comparison to past work, the FALL attack is more practical as it can often succeed (90 & x0025; of successful attempts in our experiments) by only analyzing the locked netlist, without requiring oracle access to an unlocked circuit. Our experimental evaluation shows that FALL attacks are able to defeat 65 out of 80 (81 & x0025;) circuits locked using Stripped-Functionality Logic Locking (SFLL-HD).
Keyword:
Hardware
security
logic locking
integrated circuit (IC) counterfeiting
overproduction
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期刊

IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 封面图
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
IF:
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论文数:
5.2K
被引数:
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University of Wisconsin System 封面图
University of Wisconsin System
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论文数: 5.8W
被引数: 382
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indian institute of technology system (iit system)
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论文数: 9.9W
被引数: 93
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