Non-linear Capital Taxation Without Commitment

Emmanuel Farhi

doi:10.1093/restud/rds001

2012-01-12

DOI：10.1093/restud/rds001

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摘要

En 中文

We study efficient non-linear taxation of labour and capital in a dynamic Mirrleesian model incorporating political economy constraints. Policies are chosen sequentially over time, without commitment. Our main result is that the marginal tax on capital income is progressive, in the sense that richer agents face higher marginal tax rates.

Keyword:

Capital taxation

Political economy

Progressivity

Mirrlees

H21

D72

D86

E61

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Review of Economic Studies

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6.4

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2.5K

被引数:

2.1W

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Harvard University

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26.5W

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被引数: 28.7W

universite toulouse 1 capitole

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438

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Toulouse School of Economics

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157

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被引数: 785

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