.png){kind=icon}
返回
Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1093/restud/rdq033.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
The paper studies procurement contracts with pre-project investigations in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. To model the procurer's problem, we extend a standard sequential screening model to endogenous information acquisition with moral hazard. The optimal contract displays systematic distortions in information acquisition. Due to a rent effect, adverse selection induces too much information acquisition to prevent cost overruns and too little information acquisition to prevent false project cancellations. Moral hazard mitigates the distortions related to cost overruns yet exacerbates those related to false negatives. The optimal mechanism is a menu of option contracts that achieves the dual goal of providing incentives for information acquisition and truthful information revelation.
Keyword:
Information acquisition
Procurement
Dynamic mechanism design
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
6.4
论文数:
2.5K
被引数:
2.1W
机构
引用论文
Designing efficient mechanisms for dynamic bilateral trading games.png)
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWOAAI
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWIF11.6
OAAI分享收藏
分享收藏分享收藏分享收藏
查看更多内容