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R

Roland Strausz

Humboldt University of Berlin

21H指数
132论文数
2.5K被引数
收录论文 14
发表时间
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Informative Certification: Screening versus Acquisition信息性认证：筛选与获取
errThe Review of Economic Studies
IF0
err2026-08-12
err0
errOAAI
errGorkem Celik; Roland Strausz; null
err分享
err收藏
The Irrelevance of Fee Structures for Certification
erramerican economic review
IF6.7
err2024-03-01
err0
errOAAI
errPollrich, Martin; Strausz, Roland
err分享
err收藏
Collective Brand Reputation
errJOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
IF6.3
err2023-01-01
err0
errOAAI
errNocke, Volker; Strausz, Roland
err分享
err收藏
Certification and Market Transparency
errREVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
IF6.4
err2017-10-01
err34
PREAI
errStahl, Konrad; Strausz, Roland
err分享
err收藏
A Theory of Crowdfunding: A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard
errAMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
IF11.6
err2017-06-01
err199
errOAAI
errStrausz, Roland
err分享
err收藏
Feed-in Subsidies, Taxation, and Inefficient Entry
errENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS
IF3.4
err2016-02-25
err12
PREAI
errAntoniou, Fabio; Strausz, Roland
err分享
err收藏
Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights
errREVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
IF6.4
err2015-01-07
err49
errOAAI
errKraehmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland
err分享
err收藏
On the Timing of Climate Agreements
errENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS
IF3.4
err2014-09-13
err3
PREAI
errSchmidt, Robert C.; Strausz, Roland
err分享
err收藏
Regulatory Risk Under Optimal Monopoly Regulation
errECONOMIC JOURNAL
IF3.6
err2011-06-02
err11
PREAI
errStrausz, Roland
err分享
err收藏
Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
errREVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
IF6.4
err2011-02-03
err42
errOAAI
errKraehmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland
err分享
err收藏
Planned Obsolescence as an Incentive Device for Unobservable Quality*
errECONOMIC JOURNAL
IF3.6
err2009-07-17
err22
PREAI
errStrausz, Roland
err分享
err收藏
Accounting Transparency and the Asset Substitution Problem
errACCOUNTING REVIEW
IF4.4
err2009-05-01
err25
PREAI
errBurkhardt, Katrin; Strausz, Roland
err分享
err收藏
Contracting with imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The single agent case
errECONOMETRICA
IF7.1
err2001-07-01
err137
PREAI
errBester, H; Strausz, R
err分享
err收藏
Delegation of monitoring in a principal-agent relationship
errREVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
IF6.4
err1997-07-01
err85
errOAAI
errStrausz, R
err分享
err收藏

研究方向

暂时未获取到该数据
合作学者
合作期刊
H
Helmut Bester
H 指数: 26 · 论文数: 154
V
Volker Nocke
H 指数: 25 · 论文数: 100
K
Konrad Stahl
H 指数: 22 · 论文数: 143
D
Daniel Krähmer
H 指数: 17 · 论文数: 82
R
Robert C. Schmidt
H 指数: 11 · 论文数: 58
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