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Recent Developments in Matching with Constraints

delete2017-05-01
delete18
PRE
AI
K
Kamada, Yuichiro *
F
Fuhito Kojima
DOI:10.1257/aer.p20171047delete
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摘要

摘要

En
Keyword:
SCHOOL CHOICE
DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS
CONTRACTS
MECHANISM
STABILITY
MARRIAGE
AI总结

AI总结

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期刊

American Economic Review 封面图
American Economic Review
IF:
11.6
论文数:
5.0K
被引数:
7.5W

机构

U
University of California Berkeley
学者数:
3.5W
论文数: 2.8W
被引数: 11.3W
University of California System 封面图
University of California System
学者数:
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论文数: 33.8W
被引数: 6.6K
引用论文

引用论文

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