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摘要
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We show that demanding team incentives to be robust to nonquantifiable uncertainty about the game played by the agents leads to contracts that align the agents' interests. Such contracts have a natural interpretation as team-based compensation. Under budget balance they reduce to linear contracts, thus identifying profit-sharing, or equity, as an optimal contract absent a sink or a source of funds. A linear contract also gives the best profit guarantee to an outside residual claimant. These contracts still suffer from the free-rider problem, but a positive guarantee obtains if and only if the technology known to the contract designer is sufficiently productive.
Keyword:
Moral hazard
robustness
teams
incentives
interest alignment
optimal contracts
linear contracts
maxmin
期刊
IF:
7.1
论文数:
3.0K
被引数:
4.3W
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