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SERP-SCA: A Strengthened Side-Channel Attack Framework for FALCON Signature
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DOI：10.1109/TCAD.2025.3608056.png)
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Abstract
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The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has selected Falcon as one of the standardized post-quantum digital signature algorithms, making the security of Falcon against side-channel attacks (SCAs) a critical area of concern. This article introduces SERP-SCA, a strengthened SCA framework for Falcon, which exploits leakage from floating-point multiplications to recover secret floating-point values, which can subsequently be mapped to the coefficients of the secret key. The framework adopts a divide-and-conquer strategy to target the mantissa, exponent, and sign bit of floating-point values, with specialized optimizations for attacks on the mantissa and exponent. For mantissa attacks, SERP-SCA integrates bit segmentation with a sequential attack strategy to fully exploit the leakage from mantissa multiplication and incorporates an error-correction mechanism (EC-Mechanism) to further enhance attack efficiency. For exponent attacks, SERP-SCA leverages fast Fourier transform (FFT) properties to narrow the enumeration space, significantly improving time efficiency. We conduct practical attacks on Falcon-512 and Falcon-1024 implementations running on ARM Cortex-M4. Compared with state-of-the-art methods, SERP-SCA achieves an improvement of 22.11% in success rate (SR) for Falcon-512 and 18.64% for Falcon-1024, with remarkable time efficiency gains of around 195 <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$369\times $ </tex-math></inline-formula> and 183 <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$175\times $ </tex-math></inline-formula> for mantissa attacks, and <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$180\times $ </tex-math></inline-formula> and <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$185\times $ </tex-math></inline-formula> for exponent attacks, respectively.
Keywords:
Falcon
fast Fourier transform (FFT)
post-quantum cryptography (PQC)
side-channel attacks (SCAs)
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2.9
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564
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9.6K
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