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Side-Channel Leakage in Low-Entropy Masking Schemes Attributed to FPGA Architecture
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DOI：10.1109/TCAD.2025.3607151.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
Masking is one of the most popular to guarantee the security of the cryptographic implementation against side-channel analysis (SCA). Low-entropy masking scheme (LEMS) has been proposed to relieve the high overhead by reducing the entropy of the mask. The masks are selected carefully to resist univariate first-order attacks. However, in practice, securely implementing masking can be a challenging task. In this work, we exhibit the vulnerability of LEMS implementation on field programmable gate array (FPGA). First, we provide the security model to characterize the masking balance at the implementation level. Based on the security model, we exhibit a first-order leakage in the netlist of the implementation. It can be proved that this defect is due to the uncontrollable electronic design automation (EDA) tool to optimize the advanced encryption standard (AES) Sbox implementation on the specific architecture of FPGA during synthesis. The discovered flaw can be exhibited by performing a couple of first-order attacks to recover the secret key successfully on FPGA. The vulnerability is verified by simulation and practical measurements. Finally, the potential countermeasure and security evaluation process for LEMS are provided to avoid leakage during the pre-silicon design phase.
Keywords:
Field programmable gate arrays
Entropy
Table lookup
Integrated circuit modeling
Circuits
Resists
Power demand
Computer architecture
Mathematical models
Optimization
Advanced encryption standard (AES)
field programmable gate array (FPGA)
low-entropy masking scheme (LEMS)
side-channel analysis (SCA)
Journal
I
IF:
2.9
Papers:
564
Citations:
9.6K
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Cited Papers