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Signalling chains with probe and adjust learning
DOI:10.1080/09540091.2017.1345858.png)
摘要
En 中文
Many models explain the evolution of signalling in repeated stage games on social networks, differently in this study each signalling game evolves a communication strategy to transmit information across the network. Specifically, I formalise signalling chain games as a generalisation of Lewis' signalling games, where a number of players are placed on a chain network and play a signalling game in which they have to propagate information across the network. I show that probe and adjust learning allows the system to develop communication conventions, but it may temporarily perturb the system out of conventions. Through simulations, I evaluate how long the system takes to evolve a signalling convention and the amount of time it stays in it. This discussion presents a mechanism in which simple players can evolve signalling across a social network without necessarily understanding the entire system.
Keyword:
Social learning
social networks
bounded rationality
signalling games
evolutionary dynamics
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3.4
论文数:
854
被引数:
1.5K
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