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Transparency, Protest, and Autocratic Instability
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DOI：10.1017/S0003055415000428.png)
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摘要
En 中文
The collapse of autocratic regimes is often brought about through large-scale mobilization and collective action by elements of the populace. The willingness of any given member of the public to participate in actions such as strikes and protests is contingent upon her beliefs about others' willingness to similarly mobilize. In this article, we examine the effect of a specific form of transparencythe disclosure of economic data by the governmenton citizen belief formation, and consequently on collective mobilization. We present a theoretical model in which, under autocratic rule, transparency increases the frequency of protests, and increases the extent to which protest is correlated with incumbent performance. We find empirical support for these claims. Transparency destabilizes autocracies via mass protest.
Keyword:
AUTHORITARIAN INSTITUTIONS
ECONOMIC-DEVELOPMENT
POLITICAL-ECONOMY
GLOBAL GAMES
COORDINATION
DEMOCRACY
MODERNIZATION
EQUILIBRIUM
INFORMATION
COMMITMENT
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期刊
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5.8
论文数:
8.7K
被引数:
2.1W
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