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Who Matters in Coordination Problems?
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AI
DOI：10.1257/aer.102.7.3439.png)
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摘要
En 中文
Agents face a coordination problem akin to the adoption of a network technology. A principal announces investment subsidies that, at minimal cost, attain a given likelihood of successful coordination. Optimal subsidies target agents who impose high externalities on others and on whom others impose low externalities. Based on the analysis of the role of strategic uncertainty in coordination processes, we provide a methodology that can be used to find the optimal targets for a variety of interventions in a large class of coordination problems with. heterogeneous agents.
Keyword:
FULFILLING CURRENCY ATTACKS
EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
BANK RUNS
TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
CATALYTIC FINANCE
SHOPPING MALLS
GLOBAL GAMES
EXTERNALITIES
CRISES
MODEL
期刊
IF:
11.6
论文数:
5.0K
被引数:
7.5W
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