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Communicating through Defaults
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DOI：10.1162/rest_a_01260.png)
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Abstract
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We report the results of two laboratory experiments and a repre-sentative survey that investigate how default effects are shaped by informa-tion asymmetries and strategic incentives. We document that defaults aremore informative when the interests of default setters and decision makersare more closely aligned. Decision makers' propensity to accept defaultsdepends, both, on the alignment of interests and the quality of their infor-mation. In a second experiment, we demonstrate that decision makers aremore likely to follow defaults than to accept (equally informative) advice.Complementary evidence from a representative survey underlines that con-sumers commonly perceive defaults as being set strategically.
Keywords:
LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM
DECEPTION
OPTIONS
DESIGN
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AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
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AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWIF11.6
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