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Fostering collaboration
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DOI：10.3982/TE5742.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
We study project selection and development by a principal, interacting with two agents, each of whom wants his respective project selected. When the best choice is uncertain, keeping both projects alive gives the principal the ability to adapt her choice in the future, but implies an efficiency loss of effort being spent on the project finally not chosen. We show that a time-varying threshold rule is uniquely optimal: the principal selects the first project to achieve a sufficient lead. The optimum entails initial competition, always followed by permanent collaboration. Our proof uses martingale time-change methods that apply weak solutions.
Keywords:
Project selection
internal competition
team production
collaboration
mechanism design without transfers
D72
D73
D82
D86
Journal
T
IF:
1.3
Papers:
31
Citations:
0
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JOURNAL OF FINANCE
JOURNAL OF FINANCEIF9.5
PREAI
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