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Too much can be as bad as too little: Unrelated acquisitions and corporate social performance
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DOI：10.1007/s10490-026-10167-0.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
This study examines the impact of unrelated acquisitions on corporate social performance (CSP). We find an inverted U-shaped relationship, indicating that unrelated acquisitions initially improve CSP but eventually exert a negative effect beyond a certain point. Furthermore, we explore the moderating effects of stakeholder-related factors. Specifically, conflicts between managers and shareholders are found to flatten the inverted U-shaped curve, with extreme levels of such conflicts triggering a full shape-flip into a U-shape. In contrast, dedicated institutional investor supervision steepens the curve. Additionally, we show that resource constraints influence the relationship between unrelated acquisitions and CSP. The inverted U-shaped pattern is more pronounced among financially constrained firms and those undertaking acquisitions with greater industry distance. These findings offer novel insights into the nuanced role of unrelated acquisitions in shaping long-term, stakeholder-oriented firm performance.
Keywords:
Unrelated Acquisitions
CSP
Curvilinear Moderation
Conflicts between Managers and Shareholders
Dedicated Institutional Investor Supervision
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