Ambiguous Contracts

Paul Dütting

doi:10.3982/ECTA22687

Ambiguous Contracts

2024-01-01

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AI

DOI：10.3982/ECTA22687

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We explore the deliberate infusion of ambiguity into the design of contracts. We show that when the agent is ambiguity-averse and hence chooses an action that maximizes their minimum utility, the principal can strictly gain from using an ambiguous contract, and this gain can be arbitrarily high. We characterize the structure of optimal ambiguous contracts, showing that ambiguity drives optimal contracts toward simplicity. We also provide a characterization of ambiguity-proof classes of contracts, where the principal cannot gain by infusing ambiguity. Finally, we show that when the agent can engage in mixed actions, the advantages of ambiguous contracts disappear.

Keyword:

Ambiguous contract

contract design

moral hazard

hidden action

principal-agent model

ambiguity aversion

Ambiguous Contracts

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