.png){kind=icon}
返回
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
摘要
En 中文
Microfinance institutions and other lenders in developing countries rely on the promise of future loans to induce repayment. However, if borrowers expect that others will default, and so loans will no longer be available in the future, then they will default as well. We refer to such contagion as a borrower run. The optimal lending contract must provide additional repayment incentives to counter this tendency to default. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keyword:
Microfinance
Repayment incentives
Contagion
期刊
IF:
4.6
论文数:
4.0K
被引数:
1.6W
机构
引用论文
.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
分享收藏THE BENEFITS OF LENDING RELATIONSHIPS - EVIDENCE FROM SMALL BUSINESS DATA.png)
JOURNAL OF FINANCE.png)
OAAI
JOURNAL OF FINANCEIF9.5
OAAI分享收藏分享收藏
查看更多内容