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When CEO Pay Becomes a Brand Problem
DOI:10.1007/s10551-023-05394-0.png)
摘要
En 中文
For over four decades, the topic of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation has attracted considerable attention from the fields of economics, finance, management, public policy, law, and business ethics. As scholarly interest in CEO pay has increased, so has public concern about the ethics of high CEO pay. Despite growing interest and pressure among the public and government to reduce CEO pay, it has continued to increase. Using a multi-method design incorporating a pilot study, two online experiments, and an event study, we investigate the impact of CEO pay on consumer purchase intent and find that this negative relationship is magnified under conditions of brand crisis. We also find that the negative interaction of high CEO pay and brand crisis on purchase intent is more negative when the brand has strong equity. Finally, when the CEO is awarded high pay while the firm they manage is undergoing a brand crisis, consumers lose trust in the firm's brand which reduces consumer purchase intent. This research provides insight on how governance decisions can impact consumer perceptions of corporate brands and consumer behavior, with implications for public policy leaders, boards of directors, CEOs, and Chief Marketing Officers regarding how to manage and message CEO pay.
Keyword:
CEO pay
CEO compensation
Executive compensation
Brand trust
Signaling theory
Top management team
Upper echelons
Board of directors
Brand crisis
Brand equity
AI总结
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期刊
IF:
6.7
论文数:
1.0W
被引数:
5.6W
机构
引用论文
A CONSUMER-SIDE EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION OF SIGNALING THEORY - DO CONSUMERS PERCEIVE WARRANTIES AS SIGNALS OF QUALITY信号传递理论的消费者侧实验检验-消费者是否将保修视为质量信号
The chain of effects from brand trust and brand affect to brand performance: The role of brand loyalty品牌信任、品牌影响对品牌绩效的连锁效应: 品牌忠诚的作用
JOURNAL OF MARKETING
IF10.4

