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PLATFORM ENVELOPMENT

delete2011-05-11
delete568
PRE
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T
Thomas R. Eisenmann *
G
Geoffrey Parker
M
Marshall Van Alstyne
DOI:10.1002/smj.935delete
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Abstract

Abstract

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Due to network effects and switching costs in platform markets, entrants generally must offer revolutionary functionality to win substantial market share. We explore a second entry path that does not rely upon Schumpeterian innovation: platform envelopment. Through envelopment, a provider in one platform market can enter another platform market, and combine its own functionality with that of the target in a multi-platform bundle that leverages shared user relationships. Envelopers capture market share by foreclosing an incumbent's access to users; in doing so, they harness the network effects that previously had protected the incumbent. We present a typology of envelopment attacks based on whether platform pairs are complements, weak substitutes, or functionally unrelated and we analyze conditions under which these attack types are likely to succeed. Copyright. (C) 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Keywords:
entry
platforms
network effects
bundling
two-sided markets
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Journal

Strategic Management Journal cover
Strategic Management Journal
IF:
7.2
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